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McLaughlin: Criminal Procedure - When Should a Jury Trial Be Required in the

CASENOTE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-When Should a Jury Trial be Required
in the Wyoming Municipal Courts? City of Casper v. Cheatham,
739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1987).
On December 26, 1985, officers of the Casper City Police Department arrested William Frank Cheatham on charges of driving while
under the influence of intoxicating beverages (DWUI) and resisting
arrest.' Under Casper city ordinances, neither charge was punishable
by jail.' At his initial appearance, Cheatham pleaded not guilty,
demanding a jury trial upon the DWUI charge.' The municipal judge
denied the demand. Cheatham was convicted at a bench trial and fined
$750.00.
Cheatham appealed to the district court. He claimed a right to jury
trial on three separate grounds. First, he argued that DWUI is not a
petty offense. Therefore a jury trial must be provided on constitutional
grounds.' Second, he maintained that under certain uniformity requirements of Wyoming law,6 a jury trial must be offered for DWUI charges
as a substantive right. 7 Finally, he argued that Wyoming's automatic
driver's license suspension provisions' are in themselves sufficient to
trigger the right to jury trial under Wyoming law.9 The district court
agreed, reversed Cheatham's conviction, and remanded the case for trial
by jury in the municipal court.' 0
The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the City of Casper's appeal.
Because the fine was substantial, because a subsequent conviction would
result in a mandatory jail sentence, and because the legislature had
recently increased the penalties for drunk driving convictions, the court
1. Brief of Appellant at 1, City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1987)
(No. 86-307) (hereinafter Brief of Appellant).
2. Id. Cheatham was charged with violating Casper City Ordinance §§24-27
(DWUI) and 26-36(a) (resisting arrest). CASPER, WYO. ORDINANCES §§ 24-27, 26-36(a). The
disposition of the resisting charge is not indicated, but that charge was not at issue
on appeal. Brief of Appellant at 1.
3. Brief of Appellee at 1, City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1987)
(No. 86-307) (hereinafter Brief of Appellee).
4. City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Wyo. 1987).
5. Brief of Appellee at 6.
6. The Wyoming Constitution requires that all general laws be of uniform application. Wyo. CONST. art 1, §34. Wyoming Statute section 31-5-108 provides that the
provisions of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways shall be of uniform application throughout the state, but that local authorities may adopt similar or additional
regulations not in conflict with the Act, and may enforce such local regulations in the
municipal courts. Wyo. STAT. §31-5-108 (1989).
7. Brief of Appellee at 10.
8. Wyoming Statute section 31-7-128(b) provides that a motor vehicle operator's
license must be suspended upon conviction of violating the state DWUI statute or similar
law prohibitingDWUI. WYo. STAT. §31-7-128(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
9. Brief of Appellee at 17.
10. Id. at 1.
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held that DWUI is a serious offense for which a jury trial must be
afforded as a matter of right."
By allowing a jury trial under these circumstances, Cheatham
departed from existing precedent. Under the municipal courts' rule of
criminal procedure, defendants may demand a jury trial only when a
jail sentence is provided by ordinance.12 Prior to Cheatham, the decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court had consistently adhered to that
same principle. 13 Cheatham was the first decision to hold that a nonjailable offense may nevertheless be serious enough to mandate a jury
trial. 4 This casenote examines that holding, attempting to identify
when an offense is serious enough to require a jury trial upon demand.
It concludes that Cheatham simply provides too little guidance to indicate what constitutes "seriousness" with any precision. The casenote
suggests that the Wyoming Supreme Court promulgate a new court
rule making jury trials available for all municipal offenders.
BACKGROUND

Federal Law
Persons charged with a "crime" under federal law are guaranteed
the right to a jury trial under both article III and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. 5 However, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that this right does not extend to
petty offenses."

In Duncanv. Louisiana,the Court held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment 1 7 extends the sixth amendment jury trial
right to defendants in the courts of the various states. 8 The Court reiterated that defendants charged with petty offenses do not enjoy a jury
trial entitlement.' 9
Duncan did not indicate when an offense would be considered
"petty" for purposes of jury trial entitlement. As the Court stated in
Duncan,"the boundaries of the petty offense category have always been
ill-defined, if not ambulatory."2 However, the earlier case of District
of Columbia v. Clawans indicated that offenses should be classified based
on objective criteria, such as how the offense is treated under existing
11. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
12. W.R.CR.P.J.C. 5(d).
13. See infra pp. 5-7 for discussion of pre-Cheatham case law.
14. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1223.
15. U. S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3 states, in part: "The trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." U. S. CONST. amend. VI states, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury."
16. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states, in part: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
18. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
19. Id. at 159.
20. Id. at 160.
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law.2 1 The Clawans Court further noted that the penalty authorized
for a crime may in itself mandate sixth amendment guarantees.22
The federal criminal system exemplifies the kind of "objective
criteria" which Clawansadvocated. Federal crimes are explicitly classified under federal law. The United States Code currently classifies
petty offenses as misdemeanors punishable by no more than six months
imprisonment and infractions punishable by fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars for an individual violator, or ten thousand for a corporation. 24 The classification scheme in effect when Duncan was decided
used a similar six-month cutoff. 5 Under these objective criteria, six
months imprisonment would appear to mark the outer boundary of the
petty offense for sixth amendment purposes.
Developing case law also indicated that a potential jail term of six
months would entitle a federal offender to a jury trial. 26 For example,
in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, a criminal contempt case where no maximum penalty was specified by law, the Supreme Court held that no
jury trial is required if the sentence actually imposed does not exceed
six months.2 7 In Frank v. United States, the Court declined to require
a jury trial before the judge could impose a three-year probation in lieu
of sentencing. The Court noted, however, that if probation should be
2 9
revoked, the maximum imprisonment could not exceed six months.
Finally, in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,the Court considered a case where
the sentences imposed for separate counts of direct contempt did not
exceed six months but were directed to run consecutively, thereby
aggregating in excess of two years. 30 The Court held that no one could
3
be imprisoned for more than six months without jury entitlement. 1
Under the United States Constitution, a defendant's right to a jury
trial depends upon the nature of the alleged offense. If it is a serious
crime, such as one punishable by more than six months imprisonment, a jury trial must be offered.23 For petty crimes, no such right
21. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937).
22. Id.
23. See 18 U.S.C. §3559 (1988).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571 (1988).

25. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684 (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. §1).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
27. 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966) (plurality opinion, per Clark, J.).
28. 395 U.S. 147, 150 (1969).

29. Id. at 150 n.4.
30. 418 U.S. 506, 507-10 (1974).

31. Id. at 517. Justice White's majority opinion offers the six month limit as a
settled rule of law. The opinion notes that in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970),
the six months rule announced by the three-justice plurality received the concurrences
of Justices Black and Douglas (who believed that a jury trial was required for all crimes,
399 U.S. at 74-75, and thus would certainly be required for crimes providing for more
than six months imprisonment). Thus, five members of the eight-member Baldwin Court
had agreed, at the very least, that six months imprisonment denotes a serious offense
requiring that a jury trial be available. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 512 n.4.
32. Under the federal offense classification scheme, an "infraction" punishable
by a fine of more than $5,000 ($10,000 for a corporation) is not "petty," and hence would
entail a right to jury trial. 18 U.S.C. §19 (1988). It is not clear whether this entitle-
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exists.33 However, a right to jury trial may arise under state law as
well. A state's constitution might provide a jury trial guarantee which
exceeds the scope of that provided by the fourteenth and sixth amendments.34 Moreover, a state statute may provide a more extensive jury
5
trial entitlement than required by constitution. Thus, one must look
to Wyoming law and precedent to fully identify when a Wyoming
municipal court defendant is entitled to a jury trial.
Wyoming Law
The Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in all
criminal cases. 6 However, this constitutional provision apparently does
not assure a jury trial for petty offenses. 7 In order to determine what
constitutes a "petty" offense under Wyoming law, it is necessary to
examine the background of statute, rule and case law which preceded
the Cheatham decision.
Prior to the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure
for Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts (W.R.Cr.P.J.C.), a stat3 8
ute prohibited jury trials in the municipal courts. However, municipal
court defendants were entitled to appeal an adverse decision to the district court. 9 Such appeals were not conducted on the record, but rather
resulted in a trial de41novo. 4° At the trial de novo the defendant could
demand a jury trial.
The above statute guaranteed to each defendant a right to trial by
jury. However, this right could only be exercised upon appeal, and the
jury trial itself would take place only in the district court.
Under its rule-making authority, the Wyoming Supreme Court may
supercede existing statutes of a merely procedural nature, but may not
ment is of constitutional or statutory origin. Though dicta in Duncan approved of the
federal classification scheme then in existence, 391 U.S. at 161, the Court has never
explicitly held that this classification scheme defines the "petty" offense for sixth amend-

ment purposes. It may be that the sixth amendment guarantees a jury trial only when
more than six months imprisonment is possible. The right to jury trial afforded for more
serious infractions (but nevertheless punishable by not more than five days imprisonment) may be a statutory right only, not one which derives from the constitution.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
34. Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1986).
35. See Wyo. STAT. §7-16-112 (1977) (repealed 1985).
36. WYo. CONST. art. 1, §9 states, in part: "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate in criminal cases ......
37. See Shafsky v. City of Casper, 487 P.2d 468,471 (Wyo. 1971) (noting that Wyoming Constitution article 1, section 10 [now section 9] is similar to United States Constitution amendment VI, which does not require jury trials in such cases); see also Lapp
v. City of Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 874 n.7 (Wyo. 1980) (refusing to reach the question
of whether the legislature could eliminate jury trials in petty offenses, but noting that
many states have so construed similar provisions of their respective constitutions and
pointing to the above statement in Shafsky).
38. WYO. STAT. §5-6-207 (1977), declared unconstitutionalin Brenner v. City of
Casper, 723 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1986).
39. WYO. STAT. §5-6-302 (1977) (superseded by W.R.CR.P.J.C.).
40. Id.
41. Shafsky, 487 P.2d at 469 (citing State ex rel. Suchta v. District Court, 74 Wyo.
48, 283 P.2d 1023 (1955)).
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615

extend or enlarge upon a substantive right.4" The court recognized in
Lapp v. City of Worland that a right to jury trial conferred by statute
is a substantive right.4" However, it held that such details as to where
and when the trial should take place are merely procedural.44 Accordingly, the statutory scheme outlined above could be changed under the
rule-making authority of the Wyoming Supreme Court.4
In 1974 the court's adoption of the W.R.Cr.P.J.C. dramatically
changed the statutory scheme.4 6 The W.R.Cr.P.J.C. provided in Rule
5(d) that a municipal court defendant had the right to a jury trial in
the municipal court whenever jail time would be imposed.4 7 The new
rules superseded the statutory provisions which denied the right to jury
trial at the municipal court level and provided for trial de novo upon
appeal.4"
State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court of the Town of Jackson
presented the first challenge to the provisions of the newly-adopted Rule
5(d).49 In Weber, the judge denied the defendant's jury trial demand,
indicating that he did not intend to impose a jail sentence upon conviction." Weber petitioned the Wyoming Supreme Court for a writ of
prohibition and was denied on procedural grounds.5 1 The court did not
reach the underlying issue of whether the judge could deny a jury trial
demand by declaring that he would not incarcerate the defendant upon
conviction.52
The issue surfaced again in Lapp.53 The circumstances in Lapp
resembled those in Weber, but Lapp presented the issue on direct
appeal.5 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed Lapp's conviction, construing Rule 5(d) to mean that a jury trial must be afforded if the
ordinance under which the defendant is charged provides that a jail
sentence may be imposed upon conviction. 5 The court later amended
Rule 5(d) to provide that a jury trial entitlement exists whenever the
ordinance provides for a jail sentence.5 6
42. Wyo. STAT. §§5-2-114, 115 (1977).
43. 612 P.2d at 873.
44. Id. at 872-73 (citing Stutsman v. City of Cheyenne, 18 Wyo. 499, 501, 113 P.
322, 323 (1911)).
45. Lapp, 612 P.2d at 873.
46. Id. at 870.
47. As originally adopted on October 23, 1974, Rule 5(d) provided, in pertinent
part: "(d) Jury in municipal court. - There shall be no right to demand a jury trial in
municipal courts unless a jail sentence is to be imposed upon conviction .
W.R.CR.P.J.C. 5(d).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
trial in

W.R.CR.P.J.C. 29.
567 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 700.
612 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1980).
Id. at 870.
Id. at 875.
The pertinent section now reads: "[t]here shall be no right to demand a jury
municipal courts unless a jail sentence is provided for by ordinance."

W.R.CR.P.J.C. 5(d).
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In cases following Lapp, the Wyoming Supreme Court steadfastly
adhered to the basic principle that in the municipal courts, a possible
jail sentence entitles the defendant to a jury trial. In Brenner v. City
of Casper,a DWUI case, the court considered whether Wyoming Statute section 5-6-207,' 7 which denied the right to jury trial in municipal
court for any offense, was constitutional.58 The court found that it was
not, and held that any offense punishable by incarceration is a serious
offense which triggers a constitutional right to a jury trial. 9 In Nollsch
v. City of Rock Springs, the court disregarded the defendant's claim
of a constitutional right to jury nullification (i.e., de facto repeal of an
existing statute by juries which refuse to convict) and held that he had
no right to a jury trial since his offense was not punishable by a jail
sentence.6 0 And in Dawson v. City of Casper,the court stated that since
the ordinance did not provide a jail sentence for the offense charged,
the defendant could not demand a jury trial. 1
Since the adoption of Rule 5(d), Wyoming's municipal judges, attorneys, and defendants have had little difficulty determining whether
a jury trial could be demanded for a given offense. They had only to
determine whether the ordinance provided for a jail sentence. No jail,
no jury. Cheatham, however, changed that standard.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The only question presented by Cheatham was whether a defendant charged with DWUI in a municipal court should be entitled to
2
a jury trial, even when the ordinance did not provide for a jail sentence.
63
Casper's municipal judge answered that question in the negative.
When Cheatham appealed, the district court disagreed, and remanded
for a new trial before a jury. 64 The City of Casper then appealed the
district court's decision and presented the issue to the Wyoming
Supreme Court. 5
In their briefs to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the parties offered
6
several arguments in support of their respective positions. Cheatham
argued three separate grounds for affirming a jury trial entitlement.
57. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
58. 723 P.2d 558, 559 (Wyo. 1986).
59. Id. at 561.

60. 724 P.2d 447, 450 (Wyo. 1986).
61. 731 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Wyo. 1987). Dawson had been convicted of speeding, and
raised a number of issues on appeal, including Casper's jurisdiction to bring the charge

and Dawson's right to non-attorney counsel of his choice. The court found no merit in
his arguments and dismissed each in virtual summary fashion. Id. at 1187-88.
62. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1223.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. These arguments are summarized here not only to illuminate the issues
presented, but also because these arguments, though facially persuasive, were not
adopted by the court. Since Cheathamleaves so many questions unanswered, see infra
text accompanying notes 96-107, municipal practitioners may find it helpful to know

what the court did not find persuasive.
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First he argued that DWUI is a serious offense per se.67 As evidence,
he pointed to the legislature's considerable investment of time and
energy in refining the DWUI statute 8 which formed the basis of
Casper's DWUI ordinance.6 9 He also pointed out that a second conviction under either Casper's ordinance or the state statute would result
in a mandatory jail sentence. 70 Cheatham's second argument emphasized the uniformity requirements of the Wyoming Constitution and
statutes. 71 Since persons charged with DWUI under state statute are
entitled to a jury trial, he argued that persons charged with a similar
offense under a city ordinance should be similarly entitled to a jury
trial. Finally, Cheatham argued that since he faced automatic suspension of his driver's license upon conviction, a jury trial should be
his by right.7" For one, he claimed it would be fundamentally unfair
to deprive him of such a valuable privilege without affording that right.74
Moreover, the driver's license suspension statute only operates upon
conviction of a DWUI ordinance which "substantially conforms" to
Wyoming's DWUI statute." Since defendants charged under the state
DWUI statute are entitled to a jury trial, Cheatham argued that a
municipal DWUI ordinance must also provide for a jury trial to be substantially conforming. 6
The City of Casper (Casper) argued that the "incidental consequences" of a DWUI conviction are not sufficient to make DWUI a serious offense. 7 Casper pointed out that a number of petty offenses have
many of the same repercussions as a DWUI conviction.78 Casper also
cited authority holding that incidental consequences are not part of
the sentence. 79 Finally, Casper noted that municipalities are expressly
authorized to regulate traffic.80 Casper emphasized that local traffic
ordinances need not provide the same penalties as their state statute
counterparts."
In analyzing the case, the Wyoming Supreme Court paid little attention to the arguments of the parties, focusing instead on other issues.
The court first questioned whether the fine itself might be sufficient
to confer "seriousness." The court noted that the maximum fine of
67. Brief of Appellee at 5.
68. Wyo. STAT. §31-5-233 (Supp. 1986) (current version at id. (1989)). With the exception of the penalty clause, the ordinance under which Cheatham was charged was identical to this statute. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1223.
69. Brief of Appellee at 5-6.
70. Id at 6.
71. Wyo. CONST. art. 1, §34; Wyo. STAT. §31-5-108 (1989). See supra note 6.
72. Brief of Appellee at 11-12.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 17-18.
75. WYo. STAT. §31-5-233(e) (1989).
76. Brief of Appellee at 18-19.
77. Brief of Appellant at 6.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Id. at 6 (citing Keller v. State, 723 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1986)).
80. Id. at 8. Brief of Appellant at S.
81. Id. at 9.
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$750.00 is "not an insubstantial amount."8 2 The majority considered
whether it should draw a "bright line" test of seriousness based upon
the amount of the fine, but ultimately declined to do so.11 The court

then determined that factors other than the fine should be considered
in deciding whether an offense is serious.8 4
The mandatory jail sentence for a second offender weighed most
heavily in the Cheatham court's analysis. The court noted that if Cheatam were subsequently convicted under the state DWUI statute, his
earlier conviction under the Casper DWUI ordinance would trigger a
mandatory jail sentence. Because of this, the court viewed the Casper
ordinance as being "involved in" a jail sentence. 5 More important, the
court noted that such offenses as burglary and manslaughter do not
require a mandatory jail term upon second conviction, even though they
are clearly serious offenses. 86 Finally, the court took note of the legislature's action in significantly increasing the penalties for DWUI convictions.8 7 In view of all these factors, the court held that "the offense
of DWUI is a serious offense for which there is a right to a jury trial."8 8
ANALYSIS

Perhaps the most important point to be derived from Cheatham is
one never acknowledged in the opinion. Though not explicitly stated,
Cheatham has essentially declared Rule 5(d) unconstitutional.
Cheathamheld that "the offense of DWUI is a serious offense for
' The court does not state the
which there is a right to a jury trial."89
legal foundation for this holding. However, in summarizing prior decisions on the jury trial issue, the court emphasizes Brenner v. City of
Casper.90 The Cheatham court characterizes the issue in Brenner as
being whether a municipal ordinance DWUI charge was "a serious
offense for which a jury trial must be offered pursuant to Article I, §9
of the Wyoming Constitution."9 1 This discussion of the "seriousness"
82. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

87. Id. In 1977, the penalty for 1st offense DWUI was no more than 30 days in
jail and a fine of $100, while second offense was 60 days and $200. In 1986, first offense
posed a possible sentence of six months and $750, while second offense added a mandatory jail sentence of not less than seven days and mandated a fine of not less than $200.
CompareWYo. STAT. §31-5-233 (1977) to id. (Supp. 1986). In the same time period, driver's
license suspensions which had earlier ranged from 30 days (1st offense), 60 days (2nd),
and one year (3rd), increased to 90 days (1st), one year (2nd), and three years (3rd). Compare id. (1977) to id. §§31-7-127, 128 (Supp. 1986). Finally, by 1986 the legislature had
added a provision that an offense charged under section 31-5-233 or similar local
ordinance could not be reduced or dismissed unless the prosecuting attorney filed a
statement and supporting facts with the court indicating there was insufficient evidence to convict as charged. Id. §31-5-233(h) (Supp. 1986).
88. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. 723 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1986).
91. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1223 (emphasis in original).
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of the offense is relevant only to a constitutional inquiry. 2 In holding
trial, Cheatham was
that DWUI is a "serious offense" requiring a jury
9 3
clearly construing the Wyoming Constitution.
The inescapable conclusion from Cheatham is that under the Wyoming Constitution, an offense may be a serious offense, conferring a
right to jury trial, even if no jail sentence may be imposed upon conviction. But Rule 5(d) states that "[there shall be no right to demand
a jury trial in municipal courts unless a jail sentence is provided for
by ordinance." 94 The contradiction is undeniable. And since, as just
demonstrated, the holding of Cheatham was of constitutional basis, Rule
5(d) clearly violates the Wyoming Constitution.
Since Rule 5(d) is unconstitutional, it no longer determines when
a jury trial may be demanded of right. Wyoming practitioners must
turn to the case law, and particularly to Cheatham, to determine when
a defendant is entitled to a jury.
Brenner held that "a crime punishable by any jail term . .. is a
serious crime subject to the constitutional right to a jury trial."9 5
Cheatham did not disturb this holding, so jail continues to be a factor
which makes an offense "serious." 9 6 The question is, what other factors might have this effect?
The first factor discussed in Cheatham was the size of the fine that
may be imposed.9 7 The court declined to draw a bright line test of seriousness based upon the fine, but clearly considered doing so.9" This
might imply that any offense is potentially serious if a substantial fine
is authorized. But such an implication would not be warranted. The
Wyoming legislature has authorized municipalities to impose fines of
up to $750.00 for any violation of municipal ordinance. 99 While some
municipalities may ordain specific ranges of fines for particular offenses,
others have simply declared that any offense against their municipal
code may be punished by a fine of up to $750.00.100 In such communities, reference to the maximum fine as an indicator of seriousness would
92. Neither "petty" nor "serious" appear in the relevant Wyoming rules or statutes, nor are these words employed in discussion of construction of Wyoming rules or
statutes. By their very presence, these words signify that the right being determined
is of constitutional dimension. See Brenner, 723 P.2d at 561.
93. See Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1223 (quoting from Brenner that a crime punishable by jail is a serious offense subject to a constitutional right to jury trial, followed
immediately by asking whether DWUI is a petty offense for which no such right exists).
94. W.R.CR.P.J.C. 5(d).
95. 723 P.2d at 561.
96. 739 P.2d at 1223.
97. Id. at 1224.
98. Id.
99. WYO. STAT. §15-1-103(a)(xli) (Supp. 1989).
100. See, e.g., PINEDALE, WYO.MUNICIPAL CODE §§9.36.010,.020 (1985) (all offenses
against Title 9, Public Peace, are punishable by a fine of up to $750.00 plus costs, or
for more serious offenses, a fine of up to $750.00 and/or jail of up to six months, plus
costs). For minor offenses, the municipal judge often will establish a schedule of customary fines and/or bond amounts, in order to assure uniform sentencing. In aggra-
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result in all offenses being considered serious. This is hardly consistent with the distinction which has been drawn between "serious" and
"petty" offenses. The size of the maximum fine ordained could not serve
as a realistic indicator of seriousness.
In holding that DWUI is a serious offense, the Cheatham court relied
heavily upon the fact that a second conviction would result in a mandatory jail sentence.' The court contrasted DWUI to a number of serious felonies which have no mandatory jail sentence for second conviction. 102 In essence, DWUI is inherently serious because it places the
offender "at risk" of serious consequences upon a subsequent conviction. By logical extension, any other offense where a subsequent conviction would result in penalty enhancement must be closely
scrutinized.' °3 If the enhanced penalty would be "serious," such as a
mandatory jail sentence, then the original offense which places the
offender "at risk" might also be considered serious.
Another factor considered by the Cheathamcourt was recent legislative action to increase the penalty for drunk driving in response to
public outcry.' 04 This factor was relevant in Cheatham and the court
properly noted it as evidence that DWUI is a serious offense. But this
factor is not likely to assist the municipal practitioner in determining
whether a different offense is serious. Public outcries and legislative
responses are, by their very nature, isolated occurences. Most laws do
not generate that kind of scrutiny.
Finally, one factor should be noted which was argued in the briefs
but not addressed by the court. This is the issue of incidental consequences.
The loss of a driving privilege is not considered to be part of the
sentence imposed for a DWUI conviction. The sentence consists only
of the fine and imprisonment imposed by the judge as authorized by
statute. 0 5 Because of this, Casper argued that driver's license suspenvated cases, the arresting or citing officer would have the option of requiring a mandatory appearance before the judge. Since the alleged offender would not then be permitted to post and forfeit bond, the judge would be free to impose upon conviction a greater
fine than provided by the schedule, up to the maximum $750.00, if warranted by the
facts. This discussion is principally drawn from the personal knowledge and practices
of the writer, who was a Wyoming municipal judge from 1979-84. This practice is also
followed by the City of Laramie. Telephone interview with Laramie Chief of Police
George Parker (Oct. 17, 1989). See also the Wyoming Uniform Traffic Citation and Complaint form used by the Wyoming Highway Patrol and most Wyoming municipalities
(which includes a provision for requiring a mandatory appearance instead of allowing
forfeiture of bond).
101. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
102. Id.
103. An example might be a municipal ordinance providing that a second conviction for driving while suspended would be punishable by a mandatory jail sentence.
104. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
105. The DWUI statute provides for punishment by fine of up to $750.00, six months
jail, or both. Wyo. STAT. §31-5-233(e) (1989). Casper's ordinance provides only for the
fine. CASPER, WYO. ORDINANCE §24-27. Driver's licenses are suspended pursuant to a
different statute, which is triggered by the DWUI conviction. WYO. STAT. §31-7-128
(1989).
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sion should not be a factor in determining whether to grant a jury
trial. 106 Fundamental fairness suggests otherwise.
While loss of privilege is not part of the sentence handed down by
the judge, it is certainly a consequence of the offender's conviction. And
it is a consequence imposed by law. 107 The value of that privilege is
part of the price the offender pays as a result of his conviction-perhaps
the biggest part. And he pays it because the law requires him to. The
offender neither knows nor cares that his license will be suspended
through administrative proceedings in a different government agency.
He knows and cares only that a valuable privilege has been taken from
him by force of law. What matters to him, and what should matter to
the constitutional lawyer, is the value of that privilege, and how that
value is to be balanced against the competing interests of the state.
The Wyoming Supreme Court disposed of Cheatham on other
grounds. The driver's license issue was never mentioned. If the court
ever finds it necessary to resolve that issue in the future, it should take
care to choose substance over form. A driver's license suspension may
or may not be a "serious" consequence. But it is not an irrelevant consequence merely because it happens according to administrative proceedings.
The most important aspect of Cheatham is not what the case adds
to Wyoming law, but rather what it has taken away. Cheatham has
effectively eliminated Rule 5(d). And the impact of that loss can be
devastating.
Rule 5(d) no longer sets the standard for determining when a jury
trial must be offered, and nothing else has taken its place. Wyoming
municipalities need guidance. On a practical level, jury trials cost
money. If municipalities do not know when they may be required to
offer a jury trial, they cannot anticipate what those costs will be. The
allocation of scarce resources becomes more of a crap shoot than a
budget. On a more philosophical level, municipal practitioners and
offenders, indeed, all Wyoming citizens, have a vital interest in knowing that the criminal justice system will function as the state's constitution demands. With such a central issue as jury trial entitlement
in limbo, this knowledge simply isn't possible. And the entire system
suffers as a result.
The Cheatham court declared, in effect, that the "no jail, no jury"
standard of Rule 5(d) was unconstitutional.0 " Unfortunately, Cheatham
did not provide an adequate substitute. The Cheathamcase tells us that
if the offender faces mandatory jail the next time, his offense is already
serious. 10 9 The case also tells us that the degree of public attention the
106. Brief of Appellant at 6-8.
107. Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-233(f) (1989) (declaring that in addition to punishment, those
convicted of DWUI shall suffer suspension or revocation of driver's license).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
109. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
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offense has gathered may be an indication that the offense is serious."'
Beyond these, it tells us very little.
Rule 5(d) should be replaced as soon as possible. The new rule should
indicate precisely when the municipal courts of this state need offer
a jury trial. The most appropriate replacement for Rule 5(d) would be
a return to what prevailed before Rule 5(d) was adopted.
Prior to Rule 5(d), municipal court defendants could always appeal
their convictions to district court. 1 There the offender could demand
a jury trial for any offense, no matter how trivial." 2 When Rule 5(d)
was adopted, this universal right to a jury trial was restricted to offenses
punishable by jail." 3 It would now be fitting to replace Rule 5(d) with
a rule restoring that right. In short, to provide that all defendants in
municipal courts shall have a right to jury trial for any offense.
A universal jury trial entitlement might not seem attractive to
Wyoming's municipalities. Nevertheless, there are several points to
recommend it.
First, an absolute right to jury trial has the virtue of being both
precise and universal. Municipalities know immediately what the standard calls for and to whom it applies. This aids the policy makers and
fiscal planners, who must estimate the needs of their criminal justice
system and allocate their resources accordingly. While this standard
advantage of
might increase overall demand for jury trials, the
14
knowledge would make up for the additional cost."
Some have argued that expanded access to jury trials would make
law enforcement prohibitively expensive." 5 This is a persuasive argument, but it simply is not true. In 1982, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held in the case of Goodman v. State that under Wyoming law, any
defendant tried before a justice of the peace is entitled to a jury trial
for any offense." 6 Though all five justices joined or concurred in this
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying note 39.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
113. W.R.CR.P.J.C. 5(d). Two justices have argued that in so doing, the Wyoming
Supreme Court exceeded its statutory authority. Weber, 567 P.2d at 703 (McClintock,
J., dissenting) and at 704-10 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also Lapp, 612 P.2d at 876 (Rose,
J., dissenting in part).
114. For most municipalities, the total demand for available resources habitually
outstrips resource availability. Thus, the question is not whether there is enough
money-there isn't-but rather how to distribute the shortfalls. In this environment,
one of the fiscal planner's biggest nightmares is an unavoidable expenditure-such as
a jury trial required by law-which cannot be estimated with reasonable precision. The
fear is that by the time the magnitude of the demand becomes known, so much may
have been expended on discretionary programs that the entity will have lost its flexibility to meet that nondiscretionary demand. As a former city administrator, this writer
was more than willing to exchange a larger demand of known dimension for a more
restricted demand of unknown dimension. See D. AXELROD, BUDGETING FOR MODERN
GOVERNMENT,

ch. 7.

115. See, e.g., Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224-25 (Brown, C. J., dissenting).
116. 644 P.2d 1240, 1242-43 (Wyo. 1982).
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decision, three were fearful of its anticipated consequences. They
strongly suggested that the legislature act promptly to limit jury trial
availability." 7 Yet in 1986, the state's justice courts had a total misdemeanor caseload of 30,115 new cases, and only 41 jury trials." 8 As
the majority noted in Cheatham, an expansion of jury trial entitlement
may be marked by increased demand initially, but the demand should
soon return to its previous level. 19 And as the opinion stated, "the cost
of prosecution-or better, the cost of justice.., simply cannot be a consideration." 2 '
A third factor is the value of consistent treatment between defendants in municipal courts and those appearing before the justice of the
peace. In the justice court, the defendant may demand a jury trial for
any offense.' 2 ' If, however, she is charged with the exact same conduct
in municipal court, and faces the same precise penalties, she is entitled to a jury only if the offense charged is "serious" under the vague
principles of Cheatham.'22 This disparity must be quite disturbing to
the average citizen. By adopting a rule which provides the same jury
trial entitlement to defendants in either court, the Wyoming Supreme
Court could take a significant step toward restoring public confidence
in the integrity and fundamental fairness of the criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION

By discarding the "no jail, no jury" standard for municipal courts,
the Cheatham decision has thrown Wyoming municipalities into a state
of marked disarray. There is now no rule governing when municipal
ordinance violators are entitled to a jury trial, and Cheatham itself does
little to clarify this issue. The state's municipal courts need guidance,
and they need it as soon as possible.
The Wyoming Supreme Court should acknowledge that Rule 5(d)
has been struck by implication and should promulgate another rule
in its place. That new rule should indicate clearly when a jury trial
must be offered. An appropriate rule would be to extend this right to
all defendants, as it was before Rule 5(d)'s adoption. In so doing, the
court would restore a substantive right which was lost when Rule 5(d)
was adopted. At the same time, the court would return the Wyoming
judicial system to its rightful place, in the vanguard of those institutions seeking to uphold the liberty of Wyoming citizens.
KENNETH M.

MCLAUGHLIN

117. Id. at 1243-45 (Raper, J., concurring), 1245-48 (Rooney, J., specially concurring), 1248 (Brown, J., specially concurring).
118. E. Spencer, Justice of the Peace Courts, 1986 Annual Report (Apr. 8, 1987)
(unpublished memorandum prepared for R. Duncan, Court Coordinator, Wyoming
Supreme Court).
119. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
120. Id.
121. Goodman, 644 P.2d at 1242-43.
122. Cheatham, 739 P.2d at 1224.
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